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Shouldl be more serviceable to the State, ifI took an employment, where
function would be wholly bounded in my person, and take up all my time,
than I am by instructing everyone, as I do, and in furnishing the Republic
with a great number of citizens who are capable to serve her?
XENoHON'S M EMORABIL bk. 1, ch. 6, para. 15 (ed 1903), as
quoted in a letter by Louis . Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 28,
1928).'
I
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND
PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER
From the same bits of information-letters, fragmentary notes, in-
dividuals' recollections, newspaper and historical accounts-several
different stories can emerge, as the storyteller brings to the materials his
or her own personal concerns and hypotheses. From reading some of
the correspondence between Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter,2 biog-
raphies of each,3 and assorted articles about them and the times in
which they lived,4 I envision the following exchanges between Brandeis
and Frankfurter:
The year was 1914. A young law professor, Felix Frankfurter, went to
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. B.A. 1972,
Bryn Mawr College; J.D. 1975, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Dennis E.
Curtis, William J. Genego, and Daoud Awad for their helpful comments.
1. 5 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 319 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as LETTERS].
2. E.g., 1-5 LETTERs, supra note 1. Other letters have been excerpted and summarized in B.
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIs/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982) and in H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA
OF FELIx FRANKFURTER (1981).
3. See, ag., H. HIRSCH, supra note 2; J. LASH, FROM THE DIAIES OF FELIX FRANK-
FURTER: WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY AND NOTES (1975); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE
MAN'S LIFE (1956); M. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIvE TRADITION (1981).
4. See, ag., Coleman, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian As Lawyer andAs Justice:
Extent to Which Judicial Responsibilities Affected His Precourt Convictions, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 279;
Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1965); Levy & Murphy,
Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Bran-
deis and Professor Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1252 (1980); Mason, Louis Dembitz
Brandeis: TemperedBoldness in a StandPat Society, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 421 (1967); Rauh, Felix
Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 496 (1976).
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one of his mentors, Louis Brandeis, for advice. Frankfurter had just
been offered a teaching position at Harvard Law School but was unsure
about whether to accept it. Some people from whom he had sought
guidance, such as Henry Stimson and Oliver Wendell Holmes,5 had
urged him to decline it in favor of a career in government. Moreover,
the salary was small-ranging from $6,000 to $10,000 per year 6-and
Frankfurter was not wealthy. Finally, he had doubts about his schol-
arly abilities.
7
Unlike the others, Brandeis counseled that Frankfurter take the
professorship. "[L]et those who have the responsibilities for selecting
you decide your qualifications."8 Frankfurter heeded the advice and
accepted the professorship.
In the following years, the friendship between Brandeis and
Frankfurter deepened. Brandeis involved Frankfurter in a variety of
activities, such as serving as the "Advisory Counsel" to an American
Zionist organization.9 In 1916, when Brandeis was nominated to the
Supreme Court, Brandeis relied upon Frankfurter, as well as upon
many others, to respond for him in the bitter nomination fight which
ensued.10 Brandeis' defenders succeeded; on June 1, 1916, Brandeis'
appointment to the Court was confirmed.
Shortly thereafter, Brandeis wrote Frankfurter a letter. "You have
had considerable expense . . . in public matters undertaken at my re-
quest or following up my suggestions and will have more in the future
no doubt . . . . These expenses should, of course, be borne by me."'
At first, Frankfurter demurred. 2 While he indeed had little
money and spent a substantial amount of his time offering counsel and
assistance to those who did not pay him, Frankfurter did not want to
accept financial support from Brandeis. Moreover, he knew that, were
he in need of additional funds, he could always earn money by consult-
ing for corporate law firms.13
Despite Frankfurter's polite refusal, Brandeis persisted, for several
motives supported his offer of financial support. First, Brandeis, an
avowed social activist, believed Frankfurter's energies and talents
should continue to be devoted to worthy, albeit unprofitable, causes.
Second, Brandeis felt responsible for having urged Frankfurter, his
5. Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1259.
6. B. MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 42.
7. Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1260.
8. Id (citation omitted).
9. 1d; H. HIRSCH, supra note 2, at 44. Unlike many other joint activities in which Frank-
furter may have become involved without Brandeis prompting, it appears that Frankfurter's work
in the zionist movement was, in large measure, an artifact of Brandeis' interest. See H. HIRSCH,
supra note 2, at 17-19, 23-24, 44 ("Brandeis drew Frankfurter into Zionist affairs").
10. M. UROFSKY, supra note 3, ch. VI.
11. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 40; 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 266.
12. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 40; 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 266-67.
13. See letter excerpted infra note 29.
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"half brother-half son,"'14 to accept the professorship and, with it, a
limited income. Finally, Brandeis was a millionaire and a philanthro-
pist, well practiced in giving away money.' 5 Sending the check a sec-
ond time to Frankfurter, Brandeis urged its acceptance by arguing that
the money should be viewed as reimbursement.' 6  Frankfurter
accepted.'
7
Over the years, Frankfurter grew more comfortable with the ar-
rangement. When, in 1925, his wife became ill and in need of psychiat-
ric care, he asked Brandeis for help. Brandeis responded with a check
and the following words: "I am glad you wrote me about the personal
needs .. .your public service must not be abridged." 18 Thereafter,
Brandeis' secretary sent Frankfurter about $1,750 twice a year until
some time in the 1930's.
19
This is one description of Brandeis' and Frankfurter's relationship.
Most of this story's elements, including the fact of payment, have been
disclosed by several authors20 and were well known to Frankfurter's
contemporaries.2 1 Had the narrative been told as I outline it, it would
have been an unlikely candidate for extensive media review. When the
story is told differently, however, both the press and the scholarly world
take note.22 It is this other version of these same events-a description
which alleges that Brandeis "secretly" paid Frankfurter to join Bran-
deis in an effort to shape public events while Brandeis' role remained
unknown-that has prompted both this review and a spate of others.23
Bruce Allen Murphy, in his book, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Con-
14. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 39; 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 187. According to Danelski,
Brandeis gave the same percentage of his estate to Frankfurter as Brandeis gave to his brother,
nephew, and to his wife's sisters. Danelski, Brandeis and Frankfurter, 96 HARV. L. REV. 312, 321
(1982).
15. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 41.
16. "Tihis is nothing different than your taking travelling and incidental expenses from the
Consumers League or the New Republic. ... Id at 40; 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 267.
17. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 41.
18. Id at 42; 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 187.
19. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 42. It is unclear exactly when the payments stopped. Mur-
phy cites letters dated only until 1934, id at 374 n.86, but states that the payments continued until
Frankfurter was appointed to the bench in 1939, id. at 42.
20. See, e.g., H. HIRsCH, supra note 2, at 44; M. UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 156.
21. Frank, Review of Murphy, 32 J. LEGAL EDuC. 432, 436 (1982).
22. See, e.g., the articles cited in Cover, The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPun-
LIC, May 5, 1982, at 17; Margolick, Letters Show Frankfurter a Secret Voice of Brandeis, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 3; Schlesinger, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection, The N.Y.
Times Book Rev., Mar. 21, 1982, at 5; Judging Judges, and History, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at
A22, col. 1.
23. See, e.g., Barbato, The News Is here's No News in New Book on Justices, 24 CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. 25 (1982); Cover, supra note 22; Danelski, supra note 14; Frank, supra note 21;
French, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. REV. 287 (1982); Polsby, A Tale of Two Justices, 73 COMMEN-
TARY 97 (1982); Reavley, Free Speech for Judges, LITIGATION, Fall 1982, at 5; Abrams, Brandeis:
After the "Secret Connection," N.Y. Daily L.J., July 9, 1982, at 2, col. 3; Kurland, Review of Mur.
phy, Legal Times (Washington), Apr. 12, 1982, at 10, col. I.
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nection." The Secret PoliticalActivities of Two Supreme Court Justices,24
tells the Brandeis/Frankfurter story like this:
2 5
Just one month after the opening of his first term on the Court, he
[Louis Brandeis] put the relationship [with Felix Frankfurter] on a
more business-like footing. Realizing that Frankfurter, as a professor
at the Harvard Law School, would not be able to bear the considerable
expenses associated with such a long-term lobbying effort [on behalf of
minimum wage legislation, presumably, and other issues of concern to
Justice Brandeis], 26 the justice was very willing to use for such a pur-
pose some of his considerable financial holdings, which were estimated
to be worth over 2 million dollars. . . . Brandeis wrote to [Frank-
furter and enclosed a check for $250, saying]... "[ylou have had con-
siderable expense. . . undertaken at my request or following up my
suggestions and will doubtless have more in thefuture no doubt. 27 These
expenses should, of course, be borne by me. . . ." Frankfurter re-
turned the check. . . .However, Brandeis was not to be denied...
[H]e wrote [again]: "I ought to feel free to make suggestions to you, al-
though they involve some incidental expense. And you should feel free
to incur expense in the public interest."
Over the years, in fact, Brandeis donated nearly 1.5 million dollars
to various causes. . . .What makes this particular contribution to Fe-
lix Frankfurter so unusual is that it was designed to free Brandeis from
the shackles of remaining nonpolitical while on the bench and to per-
mit him to engage freely in political affairs simply by sending to Frank-
furter . . . "suggestions"?21 for various programs.
...Thus it was that Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter
forged in 1916 a potent partnership for the purpose of shaping public
policy.
. .. [The financial aspects of his relationship with Brandeis led
Frankfurter to view himself as an employee being compensated for
services rendered.29
24. Professor Murphy's former title, "Justices as Politicians: The Extrajudicial Activities of
Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter," was not so "newsworthy" as the title he adopted. See
Murphy, Elements of Extrajudicial Strategy A Look at the Political Roles of Justices Brandeis and
Frankfurter, 69 GEO. L.J. 101, 130 n.192 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Murphy, Extrajudicial
Strategy].
25. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 40-41.
26. Murphy's phrase, "such a long-term lobbying effort", id at 40, has an unclear referent.
27. Murphy's textual phrase misquotes the letter. Brandeis actually wrote, "will have more
in the future no doubt." 4 LE'r'ras, supra note I, at 266.
28. Murphy does not note that Brandeis sent similar suggestions to many people. See, e.g.,
Letters to Jacob deHaas (June 30, 1918 & July 10, 1918), 4 Ln'ERS, supra note I, at 346, 348-49;
Letters to Julian William Mack (Sept. 1, 1920), 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 477-80; Letters to
Julian William Mack, Stephen Samuel Wise, Bernard Flexner, Jacob deHaas, Felix Frankfurter,
Robert Szold, and Alexander Sacks (Feb. 6, 1921 & Feb. 18, 1921), 4 LETTrRs, supra note I, at
530-32, 533-36.
29. Compare Murphy's earlier conclusion:
1983]
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The excerpt I have chosen comes from Murphy's first chapter, en-
titled Justice Brandeis, Professor Frankfurter. The Problem of Judicial
Temperament. In the chapters that follow, Professor Murphy relies
heavily upon italics, erratically upon footnotes, and inordinately upon
characterization to unfold his tale of Brandeis and Frankfurter. To
Murphy, the story is about Brandeis' "employ" of his "lieutenant"
Frankfurter to advance, in "secret," Brandeis' goals. Murphy
amasses-and assigns great meaning to-an impressive collection of
details about the sundry occasions when Brandeis or Frankfurter, or
both, participated in the drafting of legislation, the staffing of executive
branch departments, the writing of law review and magazine articles,
and the conduct of foreign affairs.
Murphy lets us know that he disapproves of a good deal of the
behavior he describes, especially where Frankfurter was involved.
Murphy tells us repeatedly that Frankfurter was Brandeis' "lieuten-
ant."3 In fact, Murphy uses the word "lieutenant" so frequently that
one suspects that he went over his manuscript and inserted the word
whenever he thought allegations of conspiracy or of underhanded be-
havior were necessary.
The ultimate message of the book, however, is not clear. Murphy
frames his tale with two object lessons. In an introduction, he describes
how Abe Fortas' candidacy for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
failed because of revelations that Justice Fortas had worked closely
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and had accepted a substantial sum
Certainly Brandeis never regarded Frankfurter as a mere "employee," nor could he ob-
jectively do so. Brandeis never asked the professor to undertake projects or to act on
suggestions that did not command Frankfurter's independent approval and allegiance.
Frankfurter also embarked on reform activities on his own initiative. . .[which] were
begun without prompting from the Justice. In no sense, therefore, could Brandeis think
of Frankfurter as being "on a salary," taking money in exchange for the unquestioning
performance of assigned duties.
Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1302-03.
Moreover, the letter from Frankfurter to Brandeis quoted by Murphy simply does not sup-
port Murphy's thesis that Frankfurter saw himself as an employee. Rather, the letter, excerpted
below, indicates that Frankfurter asked Brandeis for money to enable Frankfurter to engage in
"efforts of a public concern," rather than having to do "odd jobs" for some of his "New York
lawyer friends" to make the money he needed to pay for his wife's psychiatric treatment.
After considerable self-debate, I have concluded that it is unfair to withhold from
you a personal problem. To carry out the therapy prescribed ... for Marion [Frank-
furter's wife] will mean... $1500 .... There is little doubt that I could fil the gap
through odd jobs for some of my New York lawyer friends. But I begrudge the time...
that would take from intrinsically more important jobs . . . .Marion knows ... of the
extent to which you make possible my efforts of a public concern ....
From this letter, Murphy concludes Frankfurter had "no qualms about asking the Justice for a
'raise' in 1925," B. MuRPI-Y, supra note 2, at 41-42.
30. See, e.g., B. MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 39, 60, 82, 89, 99, 113, 157, 248, 258, 321, 339. As
Floyd Abrams noted, Murphy describes many people, including Brandeis' daughter, Id at 95, as
"lieutenants." Abrams also commented that "[n]o one is ever promoted in the Brandeis army
envisioned by Murphy." Abrams, supra note 23, at 2, col 4.
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for giving a law school seminar." At the other end of the book, we find
an appendix, Toward the Monastery. A Survey of Justices in Politics
from 1789 to 1916,32 in which Murphy chronicles the myriad of extra-
judicial activities undertaken by numerous Supreme Court Justices.
Professor Murphy plainly wants to use his pervasive criticism of
the Frankfurter/Brandeis relationship to instruct us, somehow, about
what relationship Supreme Court Justices should have with members
of the other branches of government. But because we also learn from
Murphy that (1) Supreme Court Justices have engaged in extrajudicial
activities ever since the inception of the Republic and that (2) some
Justices have had extensive, ongoing relations with members of the leg-
islative and executive branches, it becomes difficult to decipher pre-
cisely what Murphy's specific complaints against Brandeis and
Frankfurter are. The difficulty in understanding arises because Mur-
phy does not adhere to a consistent viewpoint. At times he attacks Jus-
tices Brandeis and Frankfurter for engaging in any activity other than
judging; at other times, Murphy appears critical of the Justices for their
failure to be effective in extrajudicial activities. One example of Mur-
phy's waffling is his critical description of Justice Frankfurter's efforts
to help Charles Wyzanski, Jr. and Henry Friendly obtain judgeships
and to promote Learned Hand for a Supreme Court appointment.33
According to Murphy, Frankfurter believed that judges should be se-
lected on their merit-rather than upon considerations of party affilia-
tion-and he attempted to convince others of the validity of his views. 4
Murphy does not allege that Frankfurter was disingenuous in espous-
ing the merit standard; rather, Murphy demonstrates that Frankfurter
consistently and vocally adhered to merit as the criterion when recom-
mending individuals to be judges. Yet Murphy does not miss an op-
portunity to make a snide comment. Murphy says of Frankfurter's
support of Wyzanski's appointment:35 "pure merit selection just hap-
pened to favor his candidate, Charles Wyzanski." Murphy's critical
note is gratuitous, in that most members of the legal establishment
shared-and share-Frankfurter's esteem for Wyzanski.3 6  But my
3 1. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 3.
32. Id at 345-63. In the appendix, Murphy details that Justices have long engaged in extra-
judicial activity, and that our modem day expectations of disengagement were not shared by our
forebearers. In the introduction to the book, however, Murphy ignores his own historical discus-
sion and states: "By tradition, those who join the judiciary recognize an implicit quidpro quo in
the judicial appointment. Given life tenure.., they are asked... to renounce voluntarily those
activities that compromise or appear to compromise the public's belief in the integrity and polit-
ical independence of the judiciary," Id at 6.
33. Id at 315-30.
34. Id at 317.
35. Id
36. See, ag., Easley, Introduction to John A. Sibley Lecture-AnAclivist Judge: Mea Maxima
1983]
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criticism of Murphy is not simply that he is needlessly nasty. Rather,
Murphy is inconsistent in his views about whether Supreme Court Jus-
tices should play any role in the selection of other judges and Justices.
After describing with apparent disapproval Justice Frankfurter's efforts
on behalf of Wyzanski and Friendly, Murphy abruptly shifts the
grounds for his attack on Frankfurter. Turning to Frankfurter's unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain a Supreme Court appointment for Learned
Hand,37 Murphy criticizes Frankfurter not for trying, but for failing to
succeed. In Murphy's words,3" "the nation was made to pay a dear
price for Frankfurter's many prior appointment campaigns, which had
had the cumulative effect of diluting the credibility of his exuberance at
the very moment he most wanted it taken at full value."
39
Murphy's ambivalence is not limited to this example. Murphy de-
scribes, with disapproval, many of the activities of Justices Frankfurter
and Brandeis. But then, the last chapter of the book concludes with a
laudatory proclamation:' ° "[T]he torch of reform had been lit by the
prophet Louis Brandeis and carried over the years by the scribe of
boundless energy, Felix Frankfurter." And, along the way, we encoun-
ter occasional tributes to the Justices for their extrajudicial efforts. In
sum, Murphy's ambivalence, and his questionable interpretation of
facts (which all too often are in effect described as "never before ap-
pearing in print"), a1 give us little help in thinking about-let alone in
understanding-what role Supreme Court Justices should play in the
world around them.
Murphy's book is disappointing because the difficult and interest-
ing questions that are implicit in its subject are left unexplored. Was
there something wrong about the payments of money by Brandeis to
Frankfurter? If so, what? Is it a question of visibility: that while
known to some,42 the payments were not widely publicized? Or does
the wrong flow not from the monetary exchange but from the associa-
Cu/pa Apologia Pro Vita Mea, 7 GA. L. REv. 202 (1973) (Easley, in introducing Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr. to give the John A. Sibley Lecture, described Wyzanski's illustrious career.).
37. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 318-20.
38. Id at 320.
39. Murphy might have argued-but did not argue-that a Justice's efforts on behalf of an
individual for a seat on the Supreme Court are more appropriate than efforts to populate the
lower courts. Murphy also neglects to remind us that Frankfurter was not alone in taking an
active role in recommending individuals for judgeships. In an earlier, co-authored work, Murphy
charts many Justices' similar attempts at influence. See Abraham & Murphy, The Influence of
Sitting and Redred Justices on Presidential Supreme Court Nominations, 3 HASTINOS CONsT. L.Q.
37 (1976).
40. B. MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 340.
41. See, eg., id at 218, 270.
42. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 21, at 436. Murphy also acknowledges that a few people
knew of the financial arrangement, B. MuRPHtY, supra note 2, at 43-44. Murphy attributes, at least
in part, Justice Brandeis' assumed desire for secrecy to a well-founded fear of anti-Semitism. Id.
[Vol. 71:776
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tion between sitting Justice and legal activist? Should we ban all extra-
judicial activities by Supreme Court Justices?
II
THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BRANDEIS AND
FRANKFURTER
Murphy, among others,4 3 has told us that, while sitting as a Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, Brandeis gave some money to
Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard Law School. Although
some of their contemporaries knew of the arrangement, neither Bran-
deis nor Frankfurter appears to have publicized it.44 Moreover, each
man, when on the Court, spoke often of the limits which his judicial
role placed upon him.
4'
The financial arrangement between Brandeis and Frankfurter
may, indeed, have been little known. But, the personal involvement
and close friendship of Brandeis and Frankfurter were common knowl-
edge. As Murphy himself has told us in an earlier work, "[b]y the end
of the 1920's, Frankfurter had become a fixture in Brandeis private and
public life. ' 46 Frankfurter openly selected Brandeis' law clerks,47 was a
Further, Murphy later states-by way of contrast to Frankfurter--that Brandeis did not "deny his
own political interests or activities," id at 258.
43. See supra note 20.
44. Since financial disclosure rules are relatively recent innovations, e.g., Judicial Personnel
Financial Disclosure Requirements, 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309 (Supp. 111978), and apply only to
government officials, it is unclear what kind of disclosure Frankfurter could have made, and Mur-
phy does not suggest what efforts to publicize the arrangement would have satisfied him. For
discussion of the propriety of Justices accepting income from outside sources, see Note, Extrajudi-
cialActiv/ties ofSupreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 598-601 (1970); CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 6 (1980) (requiring reporting of compensation received by judges for quasi-
judicial and extrajudicial activities). For a discussion of attempts to limit judges' nonjudicial ac-
tivities and to require financial disclosure, see McKay, The Judiciary and NonfudicialActivities, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 9, 14-19 (1970).
45. See, eg., Brandeis' resignation from a variety of organizations and his refusal to serve on
a commission to decide a border dispute with Mexico, described in Murphy, Extrajudicial Strat-
egy, supra note 24, at 108; see also 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 233. For another example, see
Frankfurter's assertion that the Court was a "monastery," B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at xiii, his
refusals to engage in some activities, id. at 259-60, and his criticism of Justice Douglas' extrajudi-
cial activities, id. at 261-68. See also Frankfurter, Personal mbitions of Judges: Should a Judge
"Think Beyond the Judicial", 34 A.B.A. J. 656, 658 (1948) (Supreme Court Justices must be "cir-
cumspect" in public speeches.).
Despite Frankfurter's comments about the proper scope of a Justice's extrajudicial activities,
his role as advisor to President Roosevelt has long been known. See, e.g., ROOSEVELT AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 (M. Freedman ed. 1967); a review of the
correspondence by Isenbergh, Claims of History? or What the Market will Bear?, 45 VA. Q. REv.
345 (1969); J. LASH, supra note 3. But see a review of Lash's work by Isenbergh, Frankfurter as
Policymaker, 85 YALE LU. 280, 292 (1975) ("[N]ever ... did FF think of himself nor did FDR
treat him as his principal advisor on anything.").
46. Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1296.
47. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 39; Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1292; H. HIRSCH,
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frequent guest at the Brandeis home, and edited a volume of essays
about Brandeis as a tribute to him.48 The two men did not hide their
intimacy; for several years, they vacationed together.49 Neither the fact
of the relationship nor its closeness was covert.
Was there, then, anything wrong about the fact that Brandeis gave
Frankfurter financial assistance? One concern might be that, had many
of their contemporaries known of the support Brandeis gave Frank-
furter, both men's judgments would have been suspect and neither
man's opinions valued to the extent that they were. For example, if
Brandeis had attempted to persuade one of his colleagues on the bench
of the legitimacy of his view on some issue, and in doing so had relied
upon a Frankfurter law review article, the colleague-had he known of
the financial arrangements--might well have viewed Frankfurter's
scholarship as unreliable because it had been financed by Brandeis. In
contrast, if a colleague were unaware of the financial arrangement, he
might have been persuaded by a Brandeis argument, as supported by a
Frankfurter law review article.
The difficulty with the above scenario as an explanation of what
was objectionable in the Brandeis/Frankfurter "connection" is that all
of Brandeis' colleagues must have been aware of the closeness of the
two men. If Brandeis did in fact make arguments that relied upon
Frankfurter's scholarship, the other Justices would already have been
"on notice" of the many ties between the two men and might well have
discounted the arguments in any event. Given the very public nature
of the relationship, the unpublicized fact of financial support seems
only of marginal relevance-at least insofar as it affected Justice Bran-
deis' relationships with his colleagues.5
Another kind of harm, however, must be considered. Supporting
Frankfurter might not have affected Brandeis, as jurist, but may have
undermined the integrity of Frankfurter, as scholar. The concern, of
course, is that Frankfurter was financed not merely to think, but to
think along lines approved by his mentor; as a result, his intellectual
freedom might have been substantially curtailed. The fear that eco-
nomic support may corrupt intellectual endeavors is not peculiar to
Frankfurter's case; all scholars who receive funds from outside sources,
supra note 2, at 86. According to J. LASH, supra note 3, at 36, Frankfurter also selected clerks for
Justices Holmes and Cardozo.
48. See MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (Frankfurter ed. 1932). Frankfurter collected a similar set
of essays for Justice Holmes in honor of the Justice's ninetieth birthday. See MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (Frankfurter ed. 1938). See also J. LASH, supra note 3, at 51.
49. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 77.
50. The Code of Judicial Conduct addresses the issue of judges' receipts of compensation
but not the question of judges giving gifts and compensation to others. See CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 6 (1980).
[Vol. 71:776
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such as the Department of Defense or governments of foreign coun-
tries, face the problem. Many scholars nevertheless accept such sup-
port while attempting to maintain their integrity by resisting direct
censorship and by hoping that no self-censorship occurs.
Whether the money provided by Brandeis in fact curtailed Frank-
furter's intellectual independence is difficult to assess. In an earlier
work, Murphy concluded that, prior to providing support, "Brandeis
had... satisfied himself that Frankfurter's views on virtually all im-
portant political, social, economic and legal questions were likely to
agree with his own."'" Moreover, Murphy (and others) describe
Frankfurter as having had several mentors, although most agree that
Brandeis and Frankfurter had a special closeness.5" Finally, Murphy
notes that Frankfurter undertook several major efforts without Justice
Brandeis' involvement and declined to act on some of Brandeis'
proposals. 3
Thus, while Brandeis undoubtedly had a profound influence upon
Frankfurter, as well as upon many others, we cannot know which of
Frankfurter's intellectual interests would have been pursued absent
Brandeis' support. Further, Murphy himself is ambivalent on the ques-
tion of Frankfurter's independence. In an earlier, co-authored work,
Murphy concluded that Frankfurter was not a mere "employee" but
maintained substantial independence.54 In The Brandeis/Frankfurter
Connection, however, Murphy appears to have revised his earlier as-
sessment and stresses Frankfurter's supposed subservient status.
5 5
Given the evidence Murphy provides, his second conclusion seems
unwarranted.
III
EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AND SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES
Turning from the question of financial support to the broader is-
sues, Murphy's book leaves us without guidance to ponder what harms,
if any, flowed from Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter's participation in
the world beyond the Supreme Court. By helping their associates and
clerks to get jobs, by advising their friends who were employed in di-
verse government offices, by expressing views on issues of the day, and
by coordinating legislative efforts, did these Justices violate norms of
51. Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1260-61.
52. The ties between Brandeis and Frankfurter were forged in part by the fact that both were
Jews, a minority in most of the areas in which the two worked, B. MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 8-11.
53. Levy & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1274, 1302-03.
54. Id at 1302-03.
55. B. MuRaHY, supra note 2, at 41.
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judicial behavior? And, more importantly, did the Justices dilute their
ability to judge impartially the questions presented to them? Or did
they intrude impermissibly on the work of coordinate branches of
government?
A. The Custom
From what Professor Murphy has told us,5 6 and from what we
know from others,57 we must acknowledge that, for better or worse,
and since the beginning of the Republic, many Supreme Court Justices
have undertaken extrajudicial tasks. Several Justices have been close
to and have advised Presidents.5 Others have offered counsel and
sought to intervene in both legislative and executive branch activities."9
Supreme Court Justices, both Chief and Associate, from John Jay
through Johnson, Story, Baldwin, Taney, Nelson, Chase, Field, Bran-
deis, Frankfurter, Vinson, Fortas, and Burger, have had extensive polit-
ical connections which they have used to influence the course of
events.60 Thus, to the extent that custom informs prescription, we must
conclude that our history demonstrates tolerance-if not encourage-
ment-of Supreme Court Justices' extrajudicial activities.
61
The frequency of extrajudicial behavior is not surprising.
56. Id at Appendix; Levy & Murphy, supra note 4; Murphy, Extrajudicial Strategy, supra
note 24.
57. See, e.g., R. DONAVAN, TUMULTUOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN,
1949-1953 (1982). According to Donavan, id at 382-91, Vinson advised Truman that the seizure
of steel mills was constitutionaL Thereafter, Vinson dissented from a Supreme Court decision
finding the seizures illegal. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
See also Wheeler, ExtrajudicialActivities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 123;
McKay, supra note 44, at 9, 27-36; Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme
Court Justices, 1790-1962. Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 635-36
(1962) ("the basic tradition among the Justices has been one of wide-ranging and frank out-of-
court commentary"); Note, ExtrajudicialActivities of Judges, 47 IowA L. REv. 1026 (1962); Note,
supra note 44.
58. See, eg., Note, supra note 44, at 590-91 (Chief Justice Taft as regular advisor to three
Presidents; Justice Fortas as advisor to President Johnson); R. DONAVAN, supra note 57, at 354
(President Truman consulted Chief Justice Vinson about whether to fire General MacArthur); R.
DONAVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS, THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945-1948, at 423-24
(1977) (Truman asked Vinson to go to Moscow to convey the United States' hopes for peace.).
59. Murphy states that Justice Story "virtually became a legislator on the bench." B. MUR-
PHY, supra note 2, at 352. See also Note, supra note 44, at 590 n.14 (Justice D. Davis advised
President Lincoln on several matters; Justice Stone commented on drafts of President Hoover's
speeches).
60. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at Appendix. Professor Kurland suggests that extrajudicial
pronouncements and activities of Chief Justices derive from their unique role as the chiefjudicial
officer of the United States Courts. See Kurland, Mr. Chief Justice Burger on the State of the
Judiciary-1981, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1981). The Code of Judicial Conduct ex-
pressly recognizes a role for judges in "Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the
Administration of Justice." See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1980).
61. History may also show a move from a very visible form of extrajudicial involvement
(such as Congressional authorization for Justices to engage in extrajudicial activities, see Wheeler,
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Supreme Court Justices come from the world of politics. They have
been people who, with rare exceptions, became Justices precisely be-
cause they were adept at maintaining political networks. Once these
individuals were named to the Court, it is unremarkable that they did
not immediately or completely disengage from their former patterns,
and that their lifelong efforts to exert political influence did not ab-
ruptly cease.
B. The Normative Question
To conclude that many Justices have engaged in extrajudicial ac-
tivity is not to decide whether such behavior is appropriate. That ques-
tion can only be addressed after analysis of what harms, if any, flow
from extrajudicial activity.
1. A Threat to Impartiality
Distrust of extrajudicial activity may stem from an intuition that
the extra activities will, somehow, undermine Justices' abilities to judge
impartially. That impartiality is desirable is uncontroversial.6 2 How-
ever, because we understand little of how human beings arrive at deci-
sions,6 3 and because we do not believe that absolute impartiality is
attainable, difficulties arise in deciding what rules to prescribe to pro-
mote impartiality. We can begin with an easy case. If Justice Able
advises President Baker about the constitutionality of Legislation L,
Justice Able should not participate in a subsequent decision on Legisla-
tion L's legality. This prohibition stems from several intuitions. First,
we assume that Justice Able's earlier views on the constitutionality of
Legislation L were based upon a genuinely held opinion, rationally de-
rived. As a consequence, we believe that Justice Able will be less capa-
ble of considering the question afresh than would another Justice who
had never thought about the specific issue. We assume that Justice
Able's prior "involvement" will cloud his ability to decide the question
based upon the arguments and information provided by the parties.
supra note 57, at 133-34) to a form of extrajudicial activity (such as advising presidents by tele-
phone) which is less visible.
Wheeler argues that Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalL.) 409 (1792), marked a turning point
because by it the Court declined to accept obligatory extrajudicial service. Id at 158. As Murphy
and others demonstrate, however, while the extrajudicial service may have become more informal,
it did not abate. Cf. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1980) ("A Judge Should Regulate
His Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict With His Judicial Duties").
62. The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the due process guarantees of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments require that judges be "impartial." See, e.g., In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133-34 (1955); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57-60 (1970).
63. See generally, R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (examining how preexisting knowledge structures influ-
ence individuals' judgments).
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Instead, he may simply reiterate his earlier views.64
Second, since Justice Able has already voiced an opinion on the
legality of the legislation, and because others have relied on that opin-
ion, Justice Able may have a "stake" in being right and may, for that
reason, attempt to convince his fellow Justices of the correctness of his
earlier view. Third, Justice Able may want to continue to be consulted
by President Baker. Justice Able may thus have some "interest" in the
outcome of the case, for the Court's decision may influence the Presi-
dent's assessment of Justice Able's effectiveness as an advisor. Given
these suspicions about human behavior, we craft an absolute prohibi-
tion: a Justice who has provided advice during the drafting and enact-
ment of legislation should not later sit to adjudicate its legality.
65
There are, however, harder cases. Assume, again, that Justice
Able advises President Baker about the legality of Legislation L.
Thereafter, a lawsuit is brought challenging the constitutionality of
Legislation M, which was also enacted at President Baker's request but
about which Justice Able was not consulted. May Justice Able adjudi-
cate the case?
In this example, Justice Able has, presumably, 66 not reached any
prior judgment about the specifics of the challenged legislation. The
Justice has, however, served as the President's advisor on other matters.
Does Justice Able's general advisory role preclude impartial judgment
in even those cases that are unrelated to any work the Justice has per-
formed for the President? Does a general advisory role create such "in-
terest," "involvement," or "stake" in the outcome of a case so as to
disqualify a Justice from deciding all cases in which presidential pro-
grams are challenged?
One answer may be that there are no presidential programs that
can be dissociated from any others; presidential prestige is determined
by the success or failure of all proposals. If a Justice wants to be a
member of the presidential team, then the Justice had better support all
of an administration's policies. This response, however, ignores the
substantial independence that Supreme Court Justices, as well as other
federal judges, enjoy by virtue of the constitutional guarantees of life
64. Despite such intuitions, legal rules routinely permit a judge who has adjudicated a case
to preside at subsequent hearings upon reversal and remand of an initial decision. See generally
Ratieir, Disqualification ofJudgesfor Prior JudicialActions, 3 How. L.J. 228 (1957).
65. The English common law rule was that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, Its
evolution is described in Note, Disqualfication of Judges For Preudice or Bias--Common Law
Evolution, Current Status, and 7he Oregon Experience, 48 OR. L. REV. 311, 315-20 (1969), and in
Frank, Disqualofcation of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 610 (1947).
66. A Justice's mind is not, of course, a "tabula rasa." Justices may well have thought about
and formed opinions on a variety of issues.
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tenure and no diminution of salary.67 By disagreeing with Presidents,
Justices may provoke displeasure but they are protected. Unlike other
presidential advisors, Supreme Court Justices cannot be fired.
But the fact that a Justice cannot be dismissed does not obviate the
problem. Justices who have an ongoing role within an administration
presumably enjoy the influence that they wield. As a consequence,
they may-albeit unconsciously or inadvertently-mold decisions to
please a President or to enhance their own influence within an adminis-
tration. By virtue of a role in an administration, Justices gain "inter-
ests" beyond the judicial. Judicial allegiance to Presidents undermines
independence, which, in turn, casts shadows on the impartiality of
judgments rendered. Of course, a parallel analysis applies when
Supreme Court Justices advise legislators.
Did Justice Brandeis decide cases in which his impartiality might
have been questioned because of his extrajudicial activities? Under the
standard for which I have argued above, the answer is yes-for Bran-
deis served as advisor both to Presidents and other members of the
executive branch. Professor Murphy believes, however, that despite
Brandeis' extensive contacts with the Wilson and later administrations,
Brandeis properly participated in many, but not all, of the cases in
which executive branch programs were at issue.68 Murphy does ac-
knowledge that Brandeis ruled against the legality of a bill that he had
helped to develop 69 and that Brandeis recused himself in cases chal-
lenging particular programs (such as minimum wage laws) of which he
had long been a champion.70
Although Murphy provides us with his opinions about the propri-
ety of Brandeis' participation in several cases, Murphy does not de-
velop a coherent standard of judicial behavior. Murphy neither argues
that Brandeis' extrajudicial work should always have mandated recusal
nor attempts to draw distinct lines between the categories of extrajudi-
cial actions which should have resulted in disqualification and those
which should not have. Further, Murphy does not claim that Brandeis'
involvement with Presidents and with legislative proposals inevitably
led Brandeis to uphold legislation against challenges.7 However, after
Murphy sets forth what appears to be a selective disqualification argu-
ment,72 he suddenly shifts his position. Murphy concludes his discus-
67. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
68. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 54 (Brandeis "cannot be faulted.").
69. Id at 55.
70. Id at 54.
71. Brandeis voted to overturn portions of the Lever Food Control Act, about which, accord-
ing to Murphy, he had counseled Food Administrator Herbert Hoover. Id See United States v.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921).
72. B. MuRPHY, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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sion of Brandeis' impartiality by contending that, had the public known
about the extent of Brandeis' involvement with other branches of gov-
ernment, the appearance of judicial propriety would have been under-mined along with, presumably, the legitimacy of Court decisions. 73 We
are left to surmise that Murphy has implicitly revised his initial view-
that selective disqualification would have been proper-and, in the
end, would mandate blanket disqualification whenever a Justice pro-
vides advice to the executive.
Murphy's ambivalence about what rule to advocate may be attrib-
uted to at least two factors. First, Brandeis' accomplishments are as
vast as was his network of associates; Murphy may be loath to an-
nounce a rule which, had it been in place and enforceable, would have
prohibited Brandeis from contributing as extensively as he did to the
many causes he espoused.74 Second, Murphy may want to avoid a Pol-
lyanna-like approach; in view of his opening discussion of the fre-
quency of extrajudicial activity, Murphy may believe that proposing its
ban would appear naive.
In my view, Murphy had a better argument than he made. In bits
and pieces scattered through the book,"7 Murphy implies that extraju-
dicial activity may have been inevitable, if not appropriate, during
much of the nation's history. Murphy does not, however, clearly ad-
dress the fact of change-that the grounds which supported extrajudi-
cial activity in the past no longer exist. For example, in his appendix,
Murphy suggests several reasons why Justices early in the Republic
partook of extrajudicial tasks. First, the English judges did it,76 and
many United States norms were imitative. Second, the Constitution
does not bar extrajudicial activities; 77 no mandate for revising the Eng-
lish practice was provided. Third, the possibility of extrajudicial work
may have been a necessary incentive for convincing competent men to
accept the position of Supreme Court Justice. In the early days, the
Justices did not have a lot to do.78 Individuals of the requisite stature
73. Id at 55.
74. Brandeis' work in a vast array of New Deal legislation, his efforts on behalf of zionism,
and his advice to-President Wilson during the First World War are chronicled in chapters 1-5 of
Murphy's book. See also M. UROFSKY, supra note 3; THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS (A. Lief ed. 1930).
75. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 3-15, 345-63.
76. Id at 346-47. But see Note, supra note 57, at 1026-27 (describing early common law
"incompatibility" rule, barring government officials from holding two offices which imposed in-
consistent obligations).
77. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 346. The Constitution only prohibits Supreme Court Jus-
tices from simultaneously being Justices and being in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. See
generally Wheeler, supra note 57 (examining the response of early Supreme Court Justices to
requests that they undertake extrajudicial, governmental duties).
78. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 346-48. Justices were, of course, obliged to ride circuit,
which was an arduous assignment. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
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might have been unwilling to accept the job had they been precluded
from undertaking other assignments. In fact, it may well have been the
other work-advising Presidents, drafting legislation, negotiating trea-
ties-that was attractive; accepting a seat on the Court may have been
viewed as a stepping stone to more important and interesting activi-
ties.7 9 Murphy might have argued that changes in the federal judici-
ary's work make the rationale for extrajudicial activities obsolete. In
contrast to the lighter burdens that judging may have imposed in the
past, members of today's federal bench tell us that contemporary
judges have too much judging to do.8 0 Unquestionably, the workload
of the federal courts has expanded enormously over the past 200
years. 8' As a consequence, Supreme Court Justices today can be fully
and profitably occupied when they devote all of their time and talents
to the task of adjudication. Moreover, today there is no dearth of qual-
ified and interested applicants for Supreme Court appointments; incen-
tives such as extrajudicial assignments are no longer needed. Finally,
Supreme Court Justices are specially situated. As the nine least fungi-
ble members of our judicial apparatus, they should be available to sit
on cases whenever called upon, rather than risk disqualification by par-
ticipating in extrajudicial activities.82
Given the differences in the demands placed upon Supreme Court
Justices then and now, and given the need for unquestioned impartial-
ity, Murphy might have forthrightly claimed that, whatever the propri-
ety of Brandeis' and Frankfurter's actions, Supreme Court Justices
today should no longer engage in extrajudicial tasks.83 Unfortunately,
SUPREME COURT 4-55 (1927). For a discussion of the parallel quiet at the district court level
during the first part of the nineteenth century, see M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 1798-1816 (1978).
79. From Murphy's chronicle, it appears that Justices were particularly active, extrajudi-
cially, at time of war. It may be that Justices felt obliged to accept presidential requests for assist-
ance in moments of crisis. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 302.
80. See, e.g., Burger, sn't here a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Becker, Efficient Use
of Judicial Resources, 43 F.R.D. 421 (1967).
81. For a discussion of the reasons for such expansion, see Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 396-97 (1982).
82. The tension between recusal for cause and the "duty to sit" was demonstrated in a re-
quest to Justice Rehnquist, who was asked not to participate in a case which he had mentioned, in
passing, when testifying before a Congressional subcommittee while the Justice was a member of
the Justice Department. Justice Rehnquist refused to recuse himself and participated in the deci-
sion. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Justice Rehnquist explained his decision to sit at 409
U.S. 824 (1972). His participation was criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Note, Justice
Rehnquit's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973).
83. Such a rule would prohibit Justices from actively engaging in all kinds of legislative and
presidential initiatives, including proposed court reform legislation, because such legislation may
well be reviewed by the Supreme Court, see, eg., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982) (grant ofjurisdiction to bankruptcy judges unconstitutional), or
be part of legislative packages of presidents. Under this test, the extrajudicial activities of both
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, insofar as they campaigned for the enactment of or advised
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Murphy fails to make such an argument in cogent, explicit form. In-
stead, he litters his pages with pejorative comments without articulating
the causes for his dismay, and he leaves us, unassisted by analysis, to
find our own way out of the confusion his story creates. 4
2. Concerns Beyond the Judiciary
Another way to think about the problem posed by the extrajudicial
activity of Supreme Court Justices is to consider what impact such ac-
tivity has on the spheres, other than the courtroom, in which the Jus-
tices operate. Justices who engage in extrajudicial activity may be
criticized if they use the power which accrues to them as Justices to
overwhelm opponents they encounter in other arenas. Supreme Court
Justices need not expressly threaten the use of judicial power to obtain
a coercive effect. Rather, members of the executive or legislative
branches may simply yield to a powerful Justice's request-or order-
out of fear that the Justice will later sit in judgment on proposed legis-
lation or on an executive pronouncement. As a result, members of the
nonjudicial branches may be too easily persuaded of the "wisdom" of a
Justice's view-too readily convinced out of hopes that the favor will
be returned and out of fears that disagreement carries too great a sanc-
tion. Given the possibility of such a threat-which may be inevitable
and even unintended-Justices who seek to influence the world have
too much power, and their power is illegitimate because it is based
upon the potential misuse of the judicial office.
Murphy's book does not provide much illumination of this prob-
lem.8 Brandeis was indeed influential, but the sources of his authority
appear to have been the power of his intellect and the force of his vi-
sion, rather than his position as a Supreme Court Justice.86 Brandeis
achieved acclaim and was a major public figure long before he was
presidents about legislation, were inappropriate, as were those of several Chief Justices. See
Swindler, The Chief Justice and Law Reform, 1921-1971, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 241; McKay, supra
note 44, at 12-14, 19-26 (arguing for "line drawing" rather than a ban on extrajudicial activity);
Landever, Chief Justice Burger and Extra-Case Activism, 20 J. PUB. L. 523 (1971) (advocating an
"extra-case" role for the Chief Justice in the area of judicial reform).
84. Had Murphy only provided us with information, and refrained from engaging in norma-
tive criticism, he could not easily be faulted for his failure to analyze the problem of extrajudicial
activity in general and to offer some insight into it. However, Murphy frequently moves from
description to normative analyses. Because Murphy unhesitantly characterizes events, expressing
his approval and (mostly) disapproval, he has an obligation, in my view, to explain the sources of
his views. Moreover, in Murphy's earlier work, Murphy, Extrajudicial Strategy, supra note 24, at
130 & n.192 he promised to discuss these normative issues in his book, so presumably he believes
his characterizations to constitute such a discussion.
85. Murphy does describe what he deems Brandeis' "playing political hardball" with Presi-
dent Roosevelt because of disagreements with the New Deal. B. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 140.
86. See generaly M. UROFSKY, supra note 3,passim. See especially id ch. I ("Beginnings");
ch. 10 ("nsaiah").
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named to the Court; some of Brandeis' cohorts in the "progressive"
movement expressed their distress at losing him as a colleague when
Brandeis gained confirmation to the Court.
8 7
While Frankfurter's extrajudicial efforts appear to have been less
effective, the explanation comes, once again, from the person and not
the office. Though Frankfurter sought continually to exert influence,
he did not possess as sustained a vision of what his extrajudicial efforts
were to accomplish as did Brandeis. Those whom Frankfurter sought
to influence often found him "meddlesome" rather than persuasive.
88
Whether it can be documented or not, the threat of judicial over-
reaching provides additional support for a ban on extrajudicial activity.
Preserving the independence of both the judiciary and the other
branches of government is essential to their separate operation. Per-
mitting Supreme Court Justices to attempt to influence events in coor-
dinate spheres of government undermines the legitimacy of decisions
made in all three branches.
CONCLUSION
Although our procedures for judicial selection 9 most often pro-
vide us with Supreme Court Justices who are political animals, our
hopes lead us to wish for Justices who are god-like oracles. Murphy
holds himself out as the voice of reality, a debunker of myths who
brings us into the "marble palace" 90 of the Supreme Court and reveals
to us how extensive the influence of two Supreme Court Justices was in
the world beyond that palace.
Ironically, many of his revelations contribute to the mythos of the
Justices. As Murphy chronicles the breadth of Brandeis' concerns and
the diverse events in which he played an important role, Brandeis
looms heroic. While Frankfurter remrins somewhat more to scale, the
explanation comes, in large measure, because the proportions of Mur-
phy's stage are set by the scope of Brandeis' achievements. Had Frank-
furter been contrasted with many others, his work would also have
approached the monumental. In my view, Murphy fails to diminish
the substantiality of the contributions made by either Justice. And, al-
though Murphy disparages their "connection," he provides no gui-
87. Seeid at 118.
88. Murphy describes Frankfurter's relative lack of power during World War II in chapter 8,
and his unsuccessful campaign to gain Judge Hand's appointment to the Court is related at pages
318-20. See also H. HiRscH, supra note 2, at 162, 166.
89. See generally L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1981).
90. B. MURPHY, upra note 2, at 10.
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dance in fashioning norms of what associations are appropriate for
today's Justices.
As for Murphy's claim that he has uncovered new information, he
does not, in fact, tell us much that is new. As others have described, 91 a
substantial amount of what Murphy "reveals" has been reported else-
where. Further, Professor Cover has shown that some of Murphy's
"history" is erroneous.92
Nevertheless, Murphy has returned our attention to Justices Bran-
deis and Frankfurter, and for that, he deserves credit. His book has led
me to read many of Brandeis' letters, 93 which are carefully annotated
and which, in themselves, provide a wealth of detail about the "Bran-
deis/Frankfurter connection"-including the fact of payments94 --and
about Brandeis' inordinately productive and varied life. Further, ex-
cerpts from Frankfurter's diaries provide insight into the breadth of his
interests.
Murphy's contribution may lie in his reorganization of events that
are recounted elsewhere. By careless history and provocative prose,
Murphy has sparked others to think about the roles Supreme Court
Justices should play in the legislative and executive spheres. In his ear-
lier work and in this volume, Murphy has drawn attention to a good
deal of information about Justices' activities outside the courtroom.
With this mass of data, and with energy stimulated by Murphy's over-
statements, we find ourselves considering afresh what prescriptions
should rule the extrajudicial activities of Supreme Court Justices.
91. Frank, supra note 21, at 436.
92. Cover, supra note 22, at 17.
93. 1-5 LETTERS, supra note 1.
94. See, e.g., 4 LErrERS, supra note 1, at 266-67; 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 187.
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